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only after a verdict was returned that the 
trial court "exercising its perceived 
power to engage in judicial hindsight, 
stated that it should never have permit-
ted the case to continue and sua sponte 
embarked on the sanctions phase of the 
trial." Id. at 478, 568 A.2d at 863. 
Although the court conceded that jus-
tified sanctions could be imposed for 
conduct during the trial, such as dilatory 
tactics or abusive conduct, no such alle-
gations were ever made. Id. at 479,568 
A.2d at 864. Accordingly, the court held 
that because the evidence was suffi-
ciently debatable to deny motions 
throughout the trial, it was sufficient to 
justify Gerst in bringing and continuing 
her case. Id. Thus, the court of special 
appeals concluded that the trial court's 
decision was clearly erroneous. Id. at 
479-80, 568 A.2d at 864. 
In so ruling, the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland once again clearly dis-
couraged the excessive use of Rule 1-341 
sanctions. Such use can only impose a 
chilling effect on a plaintiff's right to 
court access, while providing an uncer-
tain environment for attorneys to act. As 
the court opined, Rule 1-341 should only 
be used in the most extreme of instances 
when a claim is clearly meritless and 
intended to remedy only intentional mis-
conduct. 
- Vasiliki Papaioannou 
Pavelic & leFlore v. Marvel Entertain-
ment Group: SANCTIONS FOR VlOIA-
TIONOFHID~RurnOF~ 
PROCEDURE 11 ONLY APPLY TO 
TIlE INDIVIDUAL SIGNER 
In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Enter-
tainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989), 
the United States Supreme Court held 
that sanctions provided by Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 11 ("Rule 11") only 
applied to the attorney who signed a 
paper in violation of Rule 11, even if the 
attorney explicitly signed on behalf of his 
fIrm. 
On behalf of Northern ]. Calloway, 
attorney Ray 1. leFlore brought a willful 
copyright infringment claim in the 
United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York against Marvel 
Entertainment Group ("Marvel"). In an 
amended complaint, Calloway alleged 
that Marvel forged his signature. After 
initiation of the claim, leFlore formed the 
law partnership ofPavelic & leFlore with 
Radovan Pavelic. Several papers relying 
on the allegation of forgery were signed: 
"Pavelic & leFlore 
By /s/ Ray 1. leFlore 
(A Member of the Firm) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. " 
Id. at 457. The district court found that 
these papers were in violation of Rule 11 
and imposed a sanction in the amount of 
$100,000 against Pavelic & leFlore. 
Upon a motion by Radovan Pavelic, the 
district court shifted half of the sanction 
from the fIrm to LeFlore, because the fum 
did not exist during the major part of the 
litigation. However, the district court re-
jected Pavelic's contention that Rule 11 
only empowered the court to impose the 
sanction upon LeFlore and not upon the 
fum. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affIrmed the sanction. The Sec-
ond Circuit's decision directly conflicted 
with a Fifth Circuit holding that author-
ized Rule 11 sanctions against only the 
individual signers. Id. at 458 citing Rob-
inson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 
F.2d 1119, 1128-30 (1987)). 
Pavelic appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court and was granted certio-
rari. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the 
Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit and 
reversed the Second Circuit. In interpre-
ting Rule 11, the Court relied on the plain 
meaning of the rule. Pavelic & LeFlore, 
110 S. Ct. at 458 (citing Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 446U.S. 740, 750n.9(1980)). 
Where a pleading, motion, or other 
paper violates Rule 11, the rule requires 
the trial court to "impose upon the per-
son who signed it . . . an appropriate 
sanction." Id. The Court noted that if 
viewed in isolation, the phrase "person 
who signed" is ambiguous. Id. However, 
upon reading the phrase in the entire 
context of Rule 11, the Court reasoned 
that since Rule 11 begins "with a require-
ment of individual signature, and then 
proceed [s] to discuss the import and con-
sequences of signature, ... references to 
the signature in the later portions must 
reasonably be thought to connote the 
individual signer mentioned at the out-
set." Id. 
In rejecting Marvel's contention that 
the legal principles of partnership and 
agency should apply, the Court empha-
sized that Rule 11 established a duty that 
an attorney could not delegate. Id. at 459. 
The Court also held that although LeFlore 
explicitly signed on behalf of his fIrm, the 
sanction only applied to leFlore individ-
ually. The Court reasoned that a signature 
on behalf of a fum could not comply with 
the fIrst sentence of Rule 11, since it 
requires papers to be signed "by at least 
one attorney of record in the attorney's 
individual name." Id. The Court noted 
that in the past, the preferred practice for 
an attorney was to sign on his own behalf 
with the name of his fIrm beneath. Id. 
(citing Gavit, The New FederalRules and 
State Procedure, 25 A.B.A.). 367, 371 
(1939)). 
Although a law fum may have more 
funds than an individual signer, the Court 
noted that the purpose of the sanction 
was punishment rather than reimburse-
ment. The Court also noted that the func-
tion "of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring 
home to the individual signer his per-
sonal, nondelegable responsibility." Id. 
at 460. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
determined that holding an individual 
signer personally liable provides a greater 
economic deterrent. Id. 
In a lone dissent, Justice Marshall ar-
gued that Rule 11 sanctions can apply to 
a law fum. At fIrst, the rule uses the term 
"signer," but later in its discussion of 
sanctions, the rule uses the phrase "the 
person who signed." Id. at 461 (Marshall, 
]., dissenting). The dissent noted that in 
the context of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, one could reasonably assume 
that the drafters meant the term "person" 
to include partnerships and professional 
corporations. Id. (Marshall, )., dissent-
ing) (citing 5 u.s.c. § 551 (2); NY. Part-
nership Law § 2 (McKinney 1988)). 
Recognizing that the sanction should be 
tailored to each situation, Justice Mar-
shall opined that Rule 11 allowed the trial 
judge to decide whether sanctions 
would more properly be applied to the 
attorney or his law fum. Id. at 462 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall rea-
soned that individual accountability may 
be heightened if an attorney's negligence 
also subjected his law fIrm to liability. Id. 
at 461-62 (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
In holding that Rule 11 sanctions apply 
only to the attorney who signs a paper in 
violation of the rule, the United States 
Supreme Court precluded the applica-
tion of Rule 11 sanctions to law firms. As 
a result, parties may fmd it more difficult 
to collect reimbursement for expenses 
caused by Rule 11 violations, but per-
sonal liability may provide a greater in-
centive for attorneys to comply with Rule 
11. 
-Richard E. Guida 
Simpler v. State: POllCE MAY NOT 
FRISK A SUSPECf AS A MATI'ER OF 
ROUI1NE CAIDlON, TIJERE MUST BE 
A REASONABLE SUSPIOON TIIAT 
THE SUSPECf IS ARMED AND DAN-
GEROUS 
In Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 568 
A.2d 22 (1990) the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held the seizure of parapherna-
lia with marijuana residue was unconsti-
tutional where the suspect was frisked 
without reasonable suspicion that he was 
armed and dangerous. 
On the evening of May 8, 1987, Ser-
geant Wassmer (Wassmer), of the Cecil 
County Sheriff's Department, and a 
young explorer scout were on routine 
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patrol. Wassmer observed black smoke 
coming from a wooded area behind the 
Winding Brook Housing Project and pro-
ceeded to investigate. Wassmer and his 
companion came upon a group of three 
males and a female standing around an 
open fire drinking beer. The individuals 
appeared to be underage, therefore 
Wassmer requested identification from 
each of them. In addition, Wassmer 
frisked the three males and with consent 
searched the female's purse. The identi-
fication of one of the male suspects, Sim-
pler, disclosed he was twenty-one years 
of age. Wassmer's frisk of Simpler re-
vealed a marijuana pipe in his rear 
pocket. Wassmer believed the pipe con-
tained marijuana residue. The pipe was 
seized and Simpler was arrested. The 
three others, all juveniles, received a ci-
tation for possession of alcoholic bever-
ages. See Md. Ann. Code art. 27, Section 
400A (1957, 1989 Cum. Supp.). 
Wassmer had contact with Simpler, on 
a prior unrelated occassion, where Wass-
mer was aware Simpler had a knife used 
for the cutting of carpet, in his posses-
sion. 
Simpler's pretrial motion to suppress 
the evidence seized by the frisk was de-
nied. Judge Rasin, Jr., presiding over the 
suppression hearing stated: "[Wassmer] 
made an investigation. He observed what 
appeared to be violation of the law .... 
And it's normal for the officer to pat 
down those who were there .... " Sim-
pler, 318 Md. at 315, 568 A.2d at 23-24. 
At trial, Wassmer testified that the indi-
viduals were frisked "as a matter of rou-
tine caution" and Simpler was convicted 
of possession of marijuana. The court of 
special appeals affirmed Simpler's con-
viction. The court agreed with the State's 
position that Wassmer's knowledge of 
Simpler's having previously carried a 
carpenter's knife supplied the additional 
circumstances to justify the frisk. The 
court of appeals granted certiorari and 
reversed. 
The court of appeals began its analysis 
by noting that the sequence of events in 
the record was unclear as to whether 
Simpler was frisked before or after Wass-
mer was aware of his age. However, if 
Simpler was frisked before Wassmer 
learned of his age, then Wassmer had 
reasonable suspicion to believe Simpler 
was under the age of twenty-one and thus 
his possession of alcohol was in violation 
of art. 27, section 400A. On the other 
hand, if Simpler was frisked after Wass-
mer was aware of his age, Wassmer had 
reasonable suspicion to believe Simpler 
had obtained the beer for the juveniles, 
in violation of art. 27, section 401. Id. at 
315,568 A.2d at 24. 
A violation under either of these pro-
visions authorizes the arresting officer to 
issue a citation. See Md. Ann. Code art. 
27, section 403A. Both violations are 
merely civil offenses, which at the time 
of Simpler's violation, were subject to a 
maximum fme for first offenders of 
$100.00. Id at 316, 568A.2d at 24. 
Although Wassmer had reasonable 
suspicion that Simpler violated either 
section 400A or section 401, the viola-
tions authorized Wassmer to stop Sim-
pler, obtain indentification, and issue a 
citation. The court of appeals found 
Simpler's violation analogous to a minor 
traffic violation, in that it authorized the 
arresting officer to issue a citation. More-
over, like a minor traffic violation, nei-
ther violations were custodial arrests, 
and therefore the frisk was not justifiable 
as having been made incident to the ar-
rest. Id. at 317,568 A.2d at 25. 
In Terryv. Ohio, 392 u.S. 1 (1968), the 
Supreme Court held: 
where a police officer observes un-
usual conduct which leads him rea-
sonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot and that the persons 
with whom he is dealing may be 
armed and presently dangerous, 
where in the course of investigating 
this behavior he identifies himself as 
a policeman and makes reasonable 
inquiries, and where nothing in the 
initial stages of the encounter serves 
to dispel his reasonable fear for his 
own or others' safety, he is entitled 
for the protection of himself and 
others in the area to conduct a care-
fully limited search of the outer 
clothing of such persons in an at-
tempt to discover weapons which 
might be used to assault him. 
Simpler, 318 Md. at 317-18,568 A.2d at 
25, (quoting Terry, 392 u.S. at 30). 
The court of special appeals had pre-
viously acknowledged that" [a] lthough a 
reasonable 'stop' is a necessary predeces-
sor to a reasonable 'frisk' a reasonable 
'frisk' does not inevitably follow in the 
wake of every reasonable 'stop.''' Sim-
pler, 318 Md. at 319,568 A.2d at 25-26, 
(quoting Gibbsv. State, 18Md.App. 230, 
238-39, 306 A.2d 587, 592 (1973». In a 
similar Situation, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado held a permissible stop for un-
derage drinking did not in and of itself 
justify the subsequent frisk. Simpler, 318 
Md. at 319-20, 568 A.2d at 26 (citing 
People v. Sherman, 197 Colo. 442, 593 
P.2d 971 (1979». 
In Simpler, the court of appeals further 
stated that Terry has never been recog-
nized to authorize a frisk on the occasion 
of every authorized stop. In minor traffic 
violations, where the stops were for the 
purpose of issuing citations, other cir-
cumstances must be present in order to 
constitutionally justify the frisk, such as 
an observation of an object which might 
be a weapon or a bulge in the suspect's 
clothing. Simpler, 318 Md. at 320, 568 
A.2d at 26-27 (citing Michigan v. Long, 
463 u.s. 1032 (1983); Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 u.s. 106 (1977». 
The court of appeals recognized there 
is likely some risk to a police officer in 
every confrontation, however, the risk 
must have risen to a higher level of dan-
gerousness than was present in the case. 
Simpler and the other juveniles were 
standing in Wassmer's full view and the 
frisk was not conducted because Wass-
mer feared safety but as a "matter of 
routine caution." Simpler's offense, war-
ranting only a citation, did not in and of 
itself justify the frisk. 
Awareness on the part of the police 
officer that the suspect had previously 
been armed may, in certain instances, 
justify the frisk. Simpler 318 Md. at 318-
19,568 A.2d at 25 (citing La Fave, Search 
and Seizure: A Treatise of the Fourth 
Amendment § 9.4(a) at 505-06 (1987». 
But in Simpler, the court of appeals 
stated: "Wassmer's description of the ear-
lier occasion . . . is devoid of any aspect 
of dangerousness." The court of appeals 
explained that the carpet knife was a 
lawfully carried knife, similar to a pocket 
knife. Wassmer's knowledge that Sim-
pler had carried a carpet knife on a prior 
occasion was not reasonable suspicion 
that Simpler was armed and dangerous at 
the time of the frisk. The State failed to 
sustain its burden of showing that 
Wassmer's knowledge of Simpler's prior 
possession of the carpet knife created 
sufficient additional circumstances to jus-
tify the frisk. Simpler, 318Md. at 321,568 
A.2d at 27. 
Thus, in Simpler v. State, the court of 
appeals held that when a policeman 
stops a suspect for a minor offense, the 
officer may not, as a "matter of routine 
caution," frisk the individual. The bur-
den is on the State to demonstrate that 
the frisk was justified due to additional 
circumstances which created reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect was armed 
and dangerous at the time of the frisk. 
-Angela Vallario 
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